In the long arc of scientific discovery, the journey from initial hypothesis to mature understanding is rarely straightforward. A groundbreaking new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences sheds light on a subtle but pervasive cognitive pattern that has shaped the trajectory of scientific progress for centuries. Researchers from the University of Edinburgh and New York University reveal that from antiquity through modern times, an entrenched bias towards explaining phenomena in terms of inherent properties—rather than external interactions—has consistently delayed breakthroughs across multiple scientific disciplines.
This cognitive tendency, termed “inherence bias” by the study’s authors, posits that early scientific explanations disproportionately focus on qualities believed to be intrinsic to objects or phenomena under scrutiny. This bias is not restricted to historical thinkers; it stubbornly persists today among scientists and laypeople, constraining how new observations are initially interpreted. The implications of this discovery extend beyond the history of science into the psychology of knowledge acquisition and the philosophy of scientific explanation.
Historically, early scientific theories often rested on assumptions about substances or forces inherently residing within objects. For example, the medieval concept of “impetus” hypothesized that a projectile contained an internal motive force that propelled it forward until depleted, at which point gravity would cause it to fall. This internalist explanation was eventually supplanted by modern Newtonian physics, which clarified that motion results from external forces and that objects maintain momentum absent external influences. Such a paradigm shift exemplifies the slow but crucial migration from focusing on inherent causes toward emphasizing extrinsic interactions.
The study draws on an interdisciplinary approach, combining rigorous historical analysis with contemporary experimental psychology. A notable method involved surveying prominent historians of science across the US, UK, and Canada to identify pivotal transitions in scientific explanation. Historians consistently identified initial theories emphasizing inherent properties, which were later revised into more accurate extrinsic explanations. Take tidal phenomena as a classic example: Galileo’s early hypothesis attributed tides to the “sloshing” effect caused by Earth’s motion—an inherently Earth-bound process—whereas later scientists like Kepler and Newton correctly pointed to the Moon’s gravitational pull as the principal determinant.
One of the most striking historical examples involves the motion of microscopic pollen grains documented by Robert Brown in the 19th century. Brown originally attributed the jittery motions observed under the microscope to a supposed “vital force” present in living matter—essentially an inherent property. Subsequent research, however, identified Brownian motion as a product of molecular collisions from surrounding water molecules, an external environmental effect. This correction from internalist to interactionist explanation profoundly altered the understanding of molecular kinetics and statistical mechanics.
Importantly, the study’s authors did not stop at retrospective analysis. They sought to determine whether inherence bias is a cognitive universal affecting modern scientific thinking. By conducting a series of experiments with practicing scientists alongside adult non-scientists and young children, the researchers presented unfamiliar scientific phenomena and asked participants to generate explanations. Their findings revealed that both groups predominantly default to internalist reasoning before grappling with more complex external influences.
For instance, when non-scientists were asked why boiled distilled water contained sediment, many suggested that “heat turned water into soil”—a notion echoing archaic and incorrect internal transformation ideas. Trained scientists, while more nuanced, still displayed bias toward inherent mechanisms: explaining planetary mass loss through internal processes like volcanism without sufficiently acknowledging external star-planet interactions or space environment factors. Such evidence underscores how deep-rooted these cognitive constraints are, infiltrating even highly sophisticated scientific reasoning.
These findings carry profound implications for our understanding of cognitive architecture and the epistemology of science. The tendency to prioritize inherent properties in explanations may be a byproduct of fundamental information-processing shortcuts employed by the human brain. Such shortcuts likely served adaptive functions historically by enabling quick intuitive judgments but inadvertently become bottlenecks during complex scientific inquiry, necessitating deliberate cognitive effort to overcome initial biases.
Moreover, the research highlights an important consideration for science education and the training of future generations of scientists. Awareness of inherence bias—and of cognitive biases more broadly—should be incorporated into pedagogical frameworks to cultivate metacognitive skills that aid learners in recognizing and overcoming these mental shortcuts. Doing so could accelerate scientific discovery and foster a more nuanced appreciation of phenomena as products of dynamic interactions rather than fixed intrinsic traits.
This study also resonates with ongoing debates in philosophy of science concerning theory change and scientific revolutions. It affirms that shifts from internalist to externalist models form a recurring pattern in scientific paradigm shifts, reinforcing Thomas Kuhn’s insights about the non-linear and often convoluted nature of scientific progress. The cognitive underpinnings elucidated here provide a psychological dimension to these philosophical themes, bridging disciplinary divides between history, philosophy, and cognitive science.
Ultimately, the persistence of inherence bias reminds us that scientific innovation is as much about overcoming internal cognitive hurdles as it is about empirical discovery. The intellectual journeys of Aristotle, Robert Brown, Galileo, and Newton—each navigating the tension between ingrained intuitive explanations and emergent evidence—serve as testaments to the perseverance of critical inquiry. Today’s scientists continue this legacy, laboring to transcend inherent assumptions and embrace the complexity of interactions that govern natural phenomena.
In illuminating this cognitive bottleneck, the University of Edinburgh and NYU research offers both a cautionary tale and a hopeful directive. By recognizing these unconscious biases, scientists and educators can better design strategies that promote more accurate, externally nuanced scientific explanations from the outset, thereby enhancing the efficiency and depth of scientific understanding. This insight is poised to shape the future of scientific practice and education, emphasizing that the mind’s architecture, as much as the external world, influences the story of scientific progress.
Subject of Research: Cognitive biases affecting historical and contemporary scientific explanation
Article Title: Historical and Experimental Evidence that Inherent Properties Are Overweighted in Early Scientific Explanation
News Publication Date: 15-Sep-2025
Keywords: Science history, Psychological science, Cognitive biases, Scientific explanation, History of science, Inherence bias
Tags: challenges in scientific interpretationcognitive patterns in scientific discoverycognitive tendencies in knowledge acquisitionevolution of scientific theorieshistorical assumptions in scienceimpact of bias on scientific progressinherence bias in scientific historyinterdisciplinary study of science historyintrinsic vs extrinsic properties in sciencemodern implications of historical biasesphilosophy of scientific explanationpsychological implications of scientific thinking
