A recent systematic review has detailed the complexities surrounding inadvertent medication administration via the neuraxial route, an issue that continues to present significant clinical risks in perioperative care. By analyzing 50 reports involving 54 patients across a period spanning 1981 to 2025, the research highlights that these rare but severe medical errors stem from a spectrum of underlying human and systemic vulnerabilities. The study, conducted by examining peer-reviewed literature across multiple medical databases including PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar, provides a comprehensive overview of the factors contributing to these incidents, ranging from misidentification of syringes to deficiencies in hospital organizational safety cultures. This analysis underscores the critical need for multifaceted preventive strategies to mitigate the risks associated with intrathecal and epidural administrations.
The study methodology involved a rigorous systematic approach, adhering to PRISMA guidelines and registering the protocol with PROSPERO. The author identified reports of inadvertent neuraxial administration, excluding studies that focused on dose errors, equipment malfunctions, or non-neuraxial routes. To evaluate the clinical impact of these errors, the researcher developed a novel five-level harm scale, which categorizes consequences based on regional and systemic physiological changes, the reversibility of clinical effects, and the permanence of patient outcomes. Furthermore, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework was utilized to parse the contributing deficiencies into four distinct divisions: organizational influences, supervisory practices, preconditions for unsafe acts, and active failures.
The findings revealed that out of the 54 patients involved in these errors, two-thirds of the events occurred during the administration of epidural anesthesia or analgesia, while the remaining one-third occurred during intrathecal procedures. Demographic analysis showed that 73% of the affected patients were female, and 35 of the total cases were identified in non-obstetric surgical contexts. The spectrum of medications involved was broad, with 13 substances identified as having been administered erroneously more than once. Atropine was the most frequently reported agent, followed by remifentanil, Syntocinon, morphine, neostigmine, ondansetron, chlorhexidine, and water, reflecting a wide variety of medications commonly present in hospital clinical areas that can be inadvertently confused for the correct neuraxial agent.
In non-obstetric groups, the review identified that many errors involved the accidental administration of intravenous fluids, total parenteral nutrition, or insulin via the epidural catheter. Some reports highlighted instances where disconnected intravenous infusions, such as midazolam in an intensive care setting, were mistakenly reattached to a neuraxial line. These failures emphasize the high cognitive and physical demands placed on providers in busy surgical or post-operative environments, where reliance on visual perception and memory under stress can lead to serious lapses in task execution.
The harm analysis conducted in this review utilized the newly developed five-level scale to quantify the severity of the incidents. Level 2 harm, which describes reversible signs or symptoms requiring changes in clinical care or follow-up, was the most frequent, accounting for approximately 55.5% of the cases. These incidents included instances requiring the conversion to general anesthesia, the need for additional radiological investigations, or the premature removal of catheters. The prevalence of these incidents across all nine medication groups studied illustrates the broad scope of the risk, affecting patients in operating rooms, general hospital wards, and critical care units alike.
More severe outcomes were linked to specific high-risk substances. Level 3 harm, which encompasses life-threatening but reversible events, occurred in about one-fifth of the patients, often involving accidental remifentanil or morphine injections. Level 4 irreversible harm and level 5 fatal outcomes each occurred in 7.6% of cases and were predominantly associated with the chemical toxicity of antiseptic solutions, such as chlorhexidine and glutaraldehyde. The study notes that while antiseptics are essential for infection prevention, their accidental administration into the subarachnoid or epidural spaces leads to devastating neurotoxic damage through the disruption of neuronal cell membranes.
The application of the HFACS framework demonstrated that these errors are rarely the result of a single isolated mistake but rather a confluence of latent and active failures. Active failures, or unsafe acts, were frequently attributed to skill-based errors such as inattentiveness, failure to verify tray contents, or insufficient knowledge regarding the specific characteristics of invasive lines. Task fixation and external factors, including heavy work pressure and frequent interruptions, significantly reduced the capacity of medical staff to maintain awareness of their actions. The recurrent nature of these issues highlights a fundamental difficulty in ensuring accurate task perception and verification in high-acuity medical environments.
Beyond active individual errors, the HFACS analysis pointed toward deeper, systemic deficiencies. Latent factors included a lack of robust organizational safety procedures, inadequate supervision of staff in training, and an organizational culture that did not prioritize safety as effectively as it might. The study emphasizes that these institutional gaps set the stage for errors by creating an environment where sub-optimal practices become common. For instance, the organization of anesthesia workstations, storage compartments, and the standardization of labeling processes were identified as areas where technological and infrastructural improvements could drastically reduce the probability of error.
To address these systemic vulnerabilities, the research advocates for a multidisciplinary approach focused on four primary preventive measures: the meticulous verification of medication labels on all containers, the clear and standardized labeling of syringes and delivery devices, the implementation of double-checking protocols—whether manual or facilitated by barcode scanning technology—and the widespread adoption of NRFIT connectors for all neuraxial procedures. These measures are designed to reduce reliance on human memory and visual perception, instead fostering a environment where safety is engineered into the clinical workflow through physical and procedural design.
The study also highlights the value of post-completion verification as a cognitive tool for providers. Evidence suggests that taking a moment to re-verify a completed task, such as checking a line connection after an infusion is started, can significantly enhance accuracy and accelerate the detection of potential mistakes. By fostering a culture of self-monitoring and reflection, institutions can help providers develop more accurate mental models of their procedures, thereby mitigating the impact of complacency and distractions. This focus on improving the individual provider’s internal checks complements the broader institutional changes required to secure the neuraxial space against inadvertent harm.
Despite the insights provided, the systematic review acknowledges several limitations inherent in the source data. As the findings are based on case reports and series, they lack the statistical control of randomized trials and represent only a fraction of true incident occurrences. The absence of a clear denominator makes it impossible to calculate true incidence rates or compare risks between different hospitals or procedures. Furthermore, there is a risk of publication bias, as many minor errors or those that did not result in significant harm may remain unreported. The heterogeneity of clinical settings and the evolution of anesthetic practices over the decades also complicate the direct application of findings across different modern institutions.
Ultimately, this systematic review serves as a detailed reminder that the risks of neuraxial medication errors are persistent and require sustained attention from the entire multidisciplinary team, including anesthesiologists, surgeons, pharmacists, and nursing staff. The introduction of the five-level harm scale provides a framework for future research to categorize and compare such events, potentially aiding in the development of more universal safety metrics. By addressing the identified human and systemic factors—from improving organizational safety culture to implementing specific hardware changes like NRFIT connectors—the medical community can make meaningful strides toward reducing these rare but potentially catastrophic events in neuraxial anesthesia and analgesia.
Subject of Research: Systematic review of neuraxial medication administration errors and their contributing systemic factors.
Article Title: Neuraxial Medication Administration Errors During Anaesthesia and Perioperative Management, Consequences, Contributing Human and Systemic Factors and Their Prevention: A Systematic Review
Article References: Patel, S. (2026). Neuraxial Medication Administration Errors During Anaesthesia and Perioperative Management, Consequences, Contributing Human and Systemic Factors and Their Prevention: A Systematic Review. Pain and Therapy, 15(6), 1781-1799. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40122-026-00889-w
Image Credits: AI Generated
DOI: 10.1007/s40122-026-00889-w
Keywords: neuraxial anesthesia, medication errors, patient safety, systematic review, HFACS, perioperative management, epidural administration, intrathecal administration, medical harm, antiseptic toxicity, human factors, organizational safety, clinical anesthesia, preventive medicine, healthcare quality, NRFIT, nursing safety, anesthesiology
News Source: Ophelia Keating. (November 17, 2026). Systematic Review Links Neuraxial Medication Errors to Systemic Organizational Deficiencies. Scienmag.



